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Impact of the Threat of Biological and Chemical
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KATHLEEN A. DELANEY, M.D.*
I was asked to speak on how health care providers perceive the threat of biological and
chemical weapons against our population, and its impact on public hospitals. The potential
health impact of biological weapons used against a population was first evaluated in a 1970
study supported by the World Health Organization. The study, entitled "Health Aspects
of Biological and Chemical Weapons,", attempted to predict which toxic agents perpetra-
tors determined to achieve a maximum effect might choose. It included a hypothetical
assessment of the capacity of individual biological agents to cause mass illness and death.2
For an American population that had, for the most part, only experienced war while safely
tucked between two vast oceans and bordered by friendly neighbors, the relevant descriptor
was "hypothetical." Additionally, most Americans believed the promises of the 1972 Bio-
logical Weapons Convention.' I remember as a young physician grappling with the ethical
implications brought on by the failure of the United States to destroy the world's "last"
vials of smallpox, which were instead safeguarded by our country at Fort Dietrich. Even
the 1979 outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Russia, an event that indicated to the world
that Russia was developing biological weapons in violation of the 1972 treaty, did not in-
trude on our sense of personal safety within our communities. 4 For health care workers and
officials at local levels, as for every citizen, the events of September 11 demonstrated a
commitment and capacity to harming civilians that most had not seriously envisioned. Our
sense of vulnerability deepened as, soon after September 11, weapons-grade anthrax easily
and effectively spread through our postal system. For health care providers, especially
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http://www.who.int/emc/pdfstBIOWEAPONS_FULLTEXT2.pdf(last visited May 26, 2002).
2. Id.
3. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Apr. 10, 1972, U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R., available at http://
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those in large, urban public hospital emergency departments where the staff work on the
front line of any disaster, these events have prompted serious examination of our capacity
to respond to threats, which, although acknowledged for decades, seem more of a pos-
sibility now.
L Emergency Response
Disasters challenge hospitals all over the United States. Urban public hospitals, such as
Parkland Hospital in Dallas, Texas ("Parkland"), work with county and state systems, lead-
ing the vanguard in planning for, and dealing with, disasters. Hospitals like Parkland have
developed excellent systems for managing multiple casualties that result from severe
weather, industrial or mass transit disasters, or unusually large numbers of holiday motor
vehicle crashes. In Dallas County, we have redundant systems staffed by the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Dallas County Fire Department to manage the decontamination
of persons with chemical exposures, such as where a large industrial accident or hazardous
material highway spill occurs. The North Central Texas Trauma Regional Advisory Council
coordinates access to care for trauma victims in nineteen counties and has an extensive
communication system that identifies available hospital beds for trauma victims. The emer-
gency department at Parkland houses the Dallas County BioTel system, an emergency
medical service communications center that directs the transport of sick and injured patients
in the Dallas community. The system can also communicate with the incident command
on the scene of a major traumatic event, thereby facilitating the efficient dispersal of trauma
victims to all designated trauma center hospitals, so no individual hospital is overwhelmed.
In the event of overwhelming mass casualties, the Dallas County Emergency Operations
Center can request and receive assistance from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the National Disaster Management System, a process that has been in place
since the Korean War. Initially a military system, the National Disaster Management Sys-
tem, run by the National Public Health Service, has maintained a system for distributing
victims of both war and civilian trauma to burn and trauma centers throughout the United
States. There has yet to be an occasion to use the National Disaster Management System.
As a long time participant in the system, Parkland prepared to accept fifty traumas and
burn patients from the New York City area on September 11. Our assistance was not
needed. Despite the huge loss of life on that day, only 10 percent of the survivors required
critical care, a number that did not overwhelm the local medical resources.
The specter of mass illness forces us to confront new scenarios and acknowledge the
limitations of disaster management plans that focus on traumatic injuries. If the terrorist
agenda is to kill as many people as possible, then large cities with dense populations make
very attractive targets. If economic and social disruption is an equally important part of
their agenda, any population center could be a target.
II. Terrorism by Infection
Biological weapons give terrorists the potential to cause huge loss of life and instill terror
in an entire population. They can be released from a great distance, allowing the perpetra-
tors to escape detection. Although their production requires significant technical expertise,
biological weapons are relatively inexpensive compared to conventional or nuclear weapons.
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A. ANTHRAX
Anthrax, for example, is readily found in the soil of many Texas farming communities.
Although anyone with a college education in microbiology can grow anthrax bacilli, the
production of "weapons-grade" spores capable of causing widespread harm is not a home-
brew operation. First, some strains are not as virulent as others, so pathogenic strains must
be selected. Second, the size of the spore is very important, so a sophisticated milling
procedure is required to produce an effective weapon. Spores that are two to three microns
in diameter can go straight into the lungs and start infection. Smaller particles don't "stick"
and are exhaled, while larger particles become lodged in the upper airway and do not cause
infection. Also, the number of persons that become infected decreases as the density of the
dispersed spores or organisms decreases. To be effective, the spores have to be aerosolized
and kept aloft; they can't be too sticky and they can't be too heavy. The perpetrator also
needs an effective and undetectable dispersal mechanism. In the aftermath of September
11, it is unlikely that a crop dusting plane over a metropolitan area would get very far.
The most effective biological weapon would be safe and easy to produce, stable in storage,
highly infectious and highly lethal, communicable, and without available treatments or
effective vaccine.' Fortunately, no single agent meets all these criteria. As part of their
biological weapons program the Soviets looked at smallpox, plague, anthrax, botulism, and
various viral agents that cause encephalitis. 6 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has
also evaluated the potential destructiveness of common infectious agents.7 Q Fever, plague,
brucellosis and tularemia are diseases endemic in the United States. Q Fever and brucellosis
have relatively low mortality and therefore do not meet terrorists' objectives. Plague, bru-
cellosis, and tularemia are very difficult to produce in culture. The agents of viral enceph-
alitis present impractical production difficulties, according to the CDC, while the highly
infectious and fatal viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola, are hard to get, dangerous to
grow, and destroyed by sunlight. Fortunately, the production of botulinum toxin appears
to present insurmountable production difficulties. Judging from the strain on intensive care
resources with only five cases presented at Parkland, apocalyptic consequences would result
if terrorists were to successfully surmount these production difficulties.
The 1970 World Health Organization study evaluated the hypothetical effects of dis-
tributing fifty kilograms of various aerosolized biological agents along a two-kilometer line
upwind of a 500,000-person population.' The amount of illness produced was directly
related to both the ability to disseminate the agents and their intrinsic infectivity, while
mortality was related to their virulence. The most effective biological weapon identified by
this study was anthrax, which resulted in 95,000 hypothetical deaths. By contrast, Rift Valley
Fever caused only 400 hypothetical deaths, 500 by brucellosis. Looking at the ease of pro-
duction, infection rates, and deadliness, both anthrax and smallpox seem the most likely
weapons choice for a serious assailant.9 Each of these agents would offer very different
management challenges to a medical community. Smallpox, though highly contagious, is
5. Mark A. Kortepeter & Gerald W. Parker, Potential Biological Weapons Threats, CDC, July-Aug. 1999,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/kortepeter.htm(last visited May 26, 2002).
6. Id.
7. See generally the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Web site, available at http://
www.cdc.gov (last visited June 22, 2002).
8. Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons, supra note 1.
9. Kortepeter & Parker, supra note 5.
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easily identifiable in its infectious stage, and preventable by vaccine. Anthrax is not conta-
gious, can be prevented by antibiotics, is clinically obscure in the treatable phase but can
be easily diagnosed in the late stage.
Anthrax is endemic throughout the world, especially in farming communities. The skin
lesions characteristic of the infection have been called "Siberian Ulcer" in recognition of
the common occurrence of anthrax infection in that part of the world. Animals contract
anthrax by inhaling spores while grazing. The animal dies as the bacteria multiply in pul-
monary lymph nodes and disseminate throughout its body. Spores, which are a dormant
seed-like form of the bacillus, form as the carcass decomposes and dries. This leaves areas
of dense anthrax infectivity that may be viable for years.
Cutaneous anthrax, the most common naturally acquired form of the infection, is seen
in persons who handle the carcasses and skins of dead animals. Cutaneous anthrax has an
ulcerated, necrotic appearance that initially resembles the more familiar bite of the brown
recluse spider. Its appearance prompts the initiation of antibiotics that are generally effective
even if the presence of anthrax is not recognized until the wound cultures grow. Untreated,
the mortality rate of cutaneous anthrax is estimated at 20 percent.
Intestinal anthrax is a severe illness that occurs as a consequence of eating contaminated
meat. This form of anthrax would be highly impractical and inefficient as a means of in-
tentional dissemination of the disease to humans.
Inhalational anthrax, in which inhaled spores cause infection in the lymph nodes of the
chest, is the form that is most likely to result from a biological attack. As we all learned
from the daily news reports this fall, the early manifestations are similar to, and difficult to
distinguish from, those of influenza."° To a very experienced eye, a mild abnormality on the
chest radiograph (mediastinal widening) may give a clue to the diagnosis; however, it is not
proof of infection. The challenge anthrax presents is that while it is curable with antibiotics
in this very early stage, it becomes highly fatal as it progresses. The reluctance of health
care providers to administer antibiotics to persons with a suspected viral illness has a basis
in common sense. Antibiotics themselves have a significant risk of side effects, some of
which can be fatal. In addition, the widespread use of antibiotics creates bacterial resistance,
which makes them useless when they are truly needed.
A bedside test that demonstrated the presence of anthrax infection at an early stage would
be highly desirable but does not exist. Nasal swab cultures will be positive in some members
of an exposed population and therefore have value as an epidemiologic tool. However, they
are of little value for the diagnosis of any individual, although media coverage implied the
opposite. The advanced form of anthrax is easily diagnosed by the demonstration of the
bacillus growing in blood and spinal fluid samples. The first unexplained case of advanced
anthrax in a community would assuredly prompt a different approach than to the patient
with unexplained fever.
The 1979 release of anthrax spores in Sverdlovsk, Russia, demonstrated how cases appear
following a release of spores."I Humans became infected as far as ten kilometers from the
site of release, while animals as far away as forty kilometers were infected. Approximately
sixty-four out of an estimated seventy-five to ninety-five infected persons died, and new
10. Luciana Borio & Thomas Inglesby, Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses as Biological Weapons, 287 J. Am. MED.
AsS'N 1300 (2002), available at http://www.jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v287nl 8/abs/jst20006.html (last visited
May 26, 2002).
11. Sverdlovsk, supra note 4.
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cases continued to be observed for forty-four days after the release. This latter figure
prompted the prolonged courses of antibiotic prophylaxis that were administered to persons
suspected to be at risk during the postal assault.
B. SMALLPOX
Smallpox has been a scourge of human populations since antiquity. It is highly contagious
by respiratory transmission. Its incubation period lasts seven to seventeen days, followed
by several days of a "prodromal" fever, then the onset of the rash. The rash looks superfi-
cially like chicken pox; however, most experienced parents would recognize the difference.
Smallpox lesions are all in the same stage, rather than in the different stages (red spot,
blister, pustule, scab) that are familiar in chicken pox. The rash begins in the throat where
it is difficult to detect and then spreads to the face and limbs, whereas chicken pox is most
prominent on the trunk. Smallpox is only contagious when the rash is present, which at
least offers a means of identifying infectious persons.
Smallpox infection can be prevented by a vaccination, which is effective if given within
one week of exposure. Concerns about a smallpox epidemic could be eradicated by a return
to the practice of mass vaccination against smallpox. Unfortunately this approach carries a
significant risk to some individuals in the population. The vaccine is a live virus (vaccinia)
with potentially serious complications for persons with compromised immune systems. The
spin to the press has been that mass vaccination would be too risky because there are many
HIV-positive patients in our population. In truth, a vaccination plan would exclude any
identified HIV-positive persons, thus eliminating the increased risk of a disseminated vac-
cinia infection. These persons would still be protected from smallpox by the concept of
"herd immunity," which means simply that if no one around them were susceptible to
infection, there would be no one from whom to catch it. Persons at risk other than patients
with H1V may not be identified; thus, mass vaccination would bring a risk of serious illness
or death to a finite number of persons in the community. During the decades when smallpox
cases were still being identified, the benefit of vaccination of our population clearly out-
weighed this risk. The important question now, when not a single case of smallpox has been
observed since 1977, is whether alleviating the fear of a biological attack is worth the lives
that would certainly be lost due to vaccination. Another important consideration is the
limited available vaccine - currently only enough to protect forty million people, although
work is progressing in this area. Recent studies have demonstrated that a diluted form of
the virus retains efficacy, which offers an immediate ability to increase the current number
of effective doses.'2 There is growing support in the medical community for the vaccination
of health care workers who would be the front line of defense against an epidemic of
smallpox, and for voluntary vaccination of members of the public at large. 3
C. MAss ExPosuRE
By now all of you are familiar with the impact of random individual anthrax exposures.
A simple scenario illustrates the complex level of the planning that must occur on a national
12. Sharon E. Frey et al., Clinical Responses to Undiluted and Diluted Smallpox Vaccine, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1265-74 (2002).
13. William J. Bicknell, The Casefor Voluntary Smallpox Vaccination, 346 NEw ENc.J. MED. 1323-25 (2002).
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basis to respond to an outbreak of smallpox. Imagine the surreptitious dissemination of
aerosolized smallpox virus among passengers on an airplane traveling from Washington,
D.C. to Dallas. In Dallas, two or three hundred persons would deplane; some would stay
in Dallas, others would transfer to flights bound for Seattle, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Den-
ver, etc. One or two weeks later, individual cases of smallpox would begin to appear in cities
all over the west, necessitating a demand for investigation and vaccination that would likely
strain current local and national capabilities to respond. Dissemination of anthrax by this
scenario would cause much less illness and fewer deaths because there is no risk of spread
of the disease by infected persons, nevertheless, the terror effect would be substantial.
In order to be effective as weapons of mass destruction, chemical agents must either be
highly toxic or applied in a very high concentration. Only one episode of mass poisoning
appears in our recent history - Bhopal, India in 1984.14 In that incident, forty tons of Methyl
Isocyanate, a chemical that is toxic to the lungs, was dispersed over a city of nine hundred
thousand people. Four thousand died of lung injury, and four hundred thousand suffered
chronic lung injury. Similarly vast amounts would be needed to cause mass population injury
using agents such as mustard gas or phosgene, the "trench warfare" compounds. These
heavier-than-air compounds were effective against troops in World War I and civilians in
the Iraq-Iran war, but are not truly efficient agents for mass murder. Even cyanide, a pow-
erful toxin that is highly effective for isolated murders, would likely be required in imprac-
tical amounts to cause serious poisoning of a large population. The toxicity of nerve gases
is much, much greater than any of those agents. Their potential effects were demonstrated
in the 1995 dissemination of sain nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum
Shinrikyo terrorist group. Small, easily concealed containers of liquid satin were spilled at
a few places throughout the subway system, resulting in the poisoning of five thousand
people. I" Fortunately, only eleven died.
El. Managing Mass Contamination
The challenges of managing mass casualties related to nerve gas toxicity are substantial.
A huge field decontamination capability and a much greater availability of antidotes than
are currently stocked is needed. In addition, individual hospitals need to anticipate events
similar to what occurred in Tokyo, where the arrival of many poisoned persons by public
transportation and private vehicle contaminated the emergency departments and exposed
health care workers, 20 percent of whom became ill. Hospital personnel need personal
protective equipment, and training in its use. Hospitals need to develop a substantial ca-
pacity to contain and decontaminate exposed persons before they enter the hospital.
In dealing with biological weapons, the priorities are: (1) Early identification of the in-
fecting agent, especially those that have treatable prodromal stages (anthrax) or are pre-
vented by timely vaccination (smallpox); (2) Identification of specific groups at immediate
risk; (3) Creation of systems to distribute mass vaccination or antibiotic prophylaxis;
(4) Designation of alternative public spaces in which to care for or isolate huge numbers of
sick and/or contagious persons; and (5) Development of communication systems to keep
14. AcuSafe, Bbopal, India (1984), available at http://www.acusafe.com/Icidents/Bhopa11984/incident-
bhopall984.html (last visited May 26, 2002).
15. Sadayoshi Ohbu et al., Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway, availableathttp://www.sma.org/smj/97june3.htm
(last visited May 26, 2002).
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the public informed and to facilitate cooperation and communication among hospital pro-
viders, and city, county, and state agencies.
Since no warning lights or sirens would alert to the onset of a biological attack, a great
deal of attention has been focused on the task of recognizing the presence of an epidemic
and identifying its cause. The timely recognition of the first case of smallpox requires a
highly educated health care community. The presence of mass illness in a community due
to other agents would be rapidly suspected by the rise in unusual visits to emergency de-
partments. Although sick patients will begin to show up at doctors' and school nurses'
offices, emergency departments are best positioned to detect changes in illness and injury
patterns in the community. These departments are well attuned to both seasonal (influenza,
meningitis, New Year's Eve celebrations) and situational (a World Series game) fluctuations
in visits, so an unexpected increase in otherwise healthy persons with fever, rash, or unusual
pneumonia would prompt rapid investigation. In case it is not glaringly obvious that some-
thing is amiss, Parkland and many other urban emergency departments are keeping daily
tabs on fever patterns as an early indicator of unusual illness. Only a finite number of non-
viral pathogens cause human illness, and most hospital laboratories are sufficiently sophis-
ticated to identify even unfamiliar infectious agents, usually within twenty-four hours. For
example, in the 1980s at New York City's Bellevue Hospital, the staff became acutely aware
of a large number of previously healthy young men with very unusual and severe pulmonary
infections. Although most of the staff had never seen Pneumocystis pneumonia, using stan-
dard medical diagnostic tools we were quickly able to identify the infectious agent and
procure appropriate treatment, long before the cause of the AIDS epidemic was uncovered.
During the recent anthrax assault, the media focused on a Florida infectious disease spe-
cialist's recognition of possible anthrax in the index case, leaving the impression that were
it not for this almost fortuitous circumstance, this unusual illness might have gone unde-
tected. In reality, the hospital laboratory made the microbiological diagnosis concurrently
from examination of the patient's spinal fluid, and had full confirmation of the diagnosis
and knew the antibiotic susceptibility of the bacillus within a day of the patient's arrival. In
the present day, the significance of identifying a single case of pneumonic plague, anthrax
or smallpox would not be overlooked. Unless new technologies become available that allow
health care providers to detect the cause of an unusual illness at the patient's bedside, or
unheard of "bugs" are sent to plague us, diagnosing the presence and cause of mass illness
is likely to be the least of our problems.
For both chemical and biological exposures, the biggest challenge for communities, for
the nation, and for individual hospitals, is being prepared to care for large numbers of
exposed or sick persons. Currently most hospitals, and especially public hospitals, are over-
flowing with patients suffering from ordinary illnesses and injuries. Facilities for isolation
are very limited. At Parkland, for example, of seventy isolation beds, almost all of them are
regularly filled with tuberculosis patients. Since patients with communicable diseases could
not be shipped off to other area hospitals for care, local communities must devise other
methods of isolation such as home quarantine, designation of a single contaminated hos-
pital, or designation of large public spaces pre-supplied with caches of equipment. Com-
munity hospitals in Israel have formed creative liaisons with local hotels to expand bed
availability, and have expanded available personnel by training local high school students
to perform hospital tasks related to transport and the provision of non-technical care. Being
able to respond to the challenges of biological terrorism requires that we find creative ways
to use familiar systems and facilities. Health care providers need to increase the flexibility
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and redundancy of our communication systems, creating the ability to divert trauma com-
munication systems currently in place to effect communication about bioterror incidents.
We can broaden the training of paramedics and use the emergency medical service (EMS)
system to dispense antibiotics or vaccine. Identifying exposed, at-risk persons needing pre-
ventative vaccination or antibiotic prophylaxis will be a major public health challenge, as
will be identifying persons who need isolation. Public Health Departments accustomed to
a manageable level of tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, and investigating causes
of focal outbreaks of intestinal infections, are grossly understaffed and under-funded for
the epidemiologic tasks that would fall to them in the event of mass biological exposure.
In addition to educating health care providers, educating the public is crucial. The public
needs to understand, in advance of any attack, what procedures they would need to follow
in case of a threatening epidemic. Health care providers need to work closely with the
media to develop effective ways to communicate information to the public so their coop-
eration can be enlisted. Hospitals normally poised to compete with each other need to
develop supportive relationships, with communication capabilities that allow cross-
credentialing of health care providers, sharing of pharmaceutical resources, ready identifi-
cation and transfer of patients to available beds, and rapid dissemination of information
regarding identified infectious or chemical exposures.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the prospect of widespread terrorism creates huge challenges for local and
national governments: Planning ahead for the necessity of mass quarantine or isolation,
identifying and protecting exposed persons, and providing supportive care to huge numbers
of sick persons. Public hospitals must upgrade facilities, especially in the development of
isolation and decontamination capabilities. More importantly, they must participate in com-
munity planning for care of victims when emergency facilities are overwhelmed. Hospitals
must create effective avenues of communication with local government and public health
officials, and plan for cross credentialing that allows sharing of personnel and supplies in
case a hospital is disabled. The public must be educated and informed, and systems put in
place for ongoing sharing of information and plans during any threat.
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